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Abstract 
We present an experiment on the behavior of individual subjects across four simple economic 
games: ​the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, the Trust Game, and the Public Goods 
Gam​e. Subjects complete the games using the strategy method with role reversal. We thus gather data 
from each subject that allows us to construct a full decision plan for each role in each game, and we then 
study the relationships between behavior at the individual subject level in the different games. We find 
that dictator giving decisions are highly predictive of offers in the ultimatum game, and also of trust game 
return decisions. We also find strong relationships between behavior in the trust and public good games. 
Specifically, amounts sent in the trust game are highly predictive of unconditional contributions in the 
public good game, and demonstrating high reciprocity in the trust game by returning high proportions 
after receiving a high amount is highly predictive of heavily conditioning public good game contributions 
on the contributions of others. The finding that choices in individual games are useful for predicting 
behavior in other games indicates that the decisions that people make in simple economic games have 
validity and relevance outside of the specific game in which the decisions were made. 
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Executive Summary 
Simple economic games have been studied by economists for decades and there have been many 
variations to the basic games to test subjects’ behavior in response to certain treatments. Amongst the 
games are  the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, the Trust Game, and the Public Good 
Game. There is a large literature on these individual games; however, there lacks research on the way 
subjects behave across the four games. Here is an explanation of the four games: 
1. Dictator Game: In this game, the Dictator is endowed with $30.00. He has to make a decision 
about how much of that money he will give to the other player, the Responder. The responder is a 
passive role so the only decision being made is the allocation of money from the Dictator.  
2. Ultimatum Bargaining Game: This game has two active roles, the proposer and the responder. 
The proposer is endowed with $30.00 and has to decide how much of it he would like to offer to 
the responder. The responder has the ability to accept or reject the offer. If the Responder accepts, 
he gets the money offered to him and the Proposer keeps the rest of the endowment. If the 
Responder rejects, both the Proposer and Responder get $0.00.  
3. Trust Game: This game has two active roles, the Sender and the Receiver, who are both endowed 
with $10.00. The Sender can decide to send any amount of his endowment to the receiver. When 
money is sent it is tripled, and the Receiver gets the tripled amount. The Receiver then has the 
opportunity to send money back to the Sender.  
4. Public Good Game: This game typically has four players who are each endowed with $10.00. 
They each have to decide how much they would like to contribute to the public good. The total 
contributions from all four players gets doubled and then divided evenly amongst the four 
players, regardless of how much each contributed.  
Our experiment is the first that looks at behavior across four simple economic games. Our 
purpose is to see if behavior in one game is predictive of behavior in the other games. ​The idea that 
behavior in one game is predictive of behavior in another game indicates that predicting a person’s 
behavior, such as propensity to free ride, may be made easier through analysis of other economic 
decisions, like their willingness to give to charity. The results of our experiment can have extensive 
applications to public policy in the future, as more experiments are conducted on the subject. 
We conducted six experiment sessions with eight participants each. The participants sat at 
computers, without face to face interaction with each other, and made decisions in four simple economic 
games: the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, the Trust Game, and the Public Goods 
Game. In order to get the most information from each subject, we used the strategy method for collecting 
economic decisions, and we included role reversal, which means each subject made decisions for each 
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role in each game. The participants were paid in cash at the end of the study based on their decisions in 
one of the games that was randomly chosen by the computer. Paying for one of the games ensured valid 
decision making influenced by real stakes.  
We ran regressions to see the extent to which each of the decisions in the games were linked to 
each other. More specifically, the regressions tested to see how a person’s degree of altruism, 
strategicness, envy (inequity aversion), guilt (inequity aversion), trust, reciprocity, and cooperation could 
be connected across the games.  
I​We found that the Dictator Game giving decision, which measures altruism, is predictive of 
average proportion returned in the Trust Game, which measures trustworthiness. We also find that the 
minimum acceptable offer (MAO) in the ultimatum bargaining game, which measures the envy 
component of inequity aversion, is predictive of the amount offered, which measures altruism and 
strategicness.  
There are three key findings relating to the Trust Game. The first finding is that the amount sent, 
which measures profit-seeking and expected reciprocity, is predictive of the average proportion returned 
in the Trust Game, which measures trustworthiness, often thought of as altruism and reciprocity. The 
second key finding relating to this game is that the amount sent is predictive of the unconditional 
contribution in the public goods game, linking trust to reciprocity as a result of profit seeking. The last 
finding is that the strength of reciprocity in the Trust Game is predictive of the strength of reciprocity in 
the Public Good Game.  
Also in the Public Good game, we found that there is a strong relationship between average 
conditional contributions, which measure altruism and strategicness, and unconditional contributions, 
which measure reciprocity. ​Our study shows that knowing behavior from one game can predict behavior 
outside of the specific game, which has extensive applications to public policy, such as knowing that a 
person who is altruistic in one situation will also be altruistic in a different situation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Many games have been used to test social preferences, including the Dictator Game, the 
Ultimatum Bargaining Game, the Trust Game, and the Public Good Game. The games test for altruistic 
behavior, trusting behavior, strategic behavior, reciprocity, and free riding. There is a wealth of literature 
on these individual games and much research has been done on analyzing behavior in these individual 
games along with different variations of the games. However, there lacks research of behavior across the 
four games. By looking across all four, we can see if behavior in one game is predictive of behavior in the 
other games.  
In this study, we conducted lab experiments to test preferences and behavior regarding the 
allocation of money across the four games mentioned above. In total, we ran six lab sessions in the 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute Social Science and Policy Studies Department’s Experimental Economics 
Laboratory, with eight subjects in each session. The subjects were asked to make decisions for four stages 
of the experiment, where each “stage” was one game. The games were ordered based on complexity 
going from the Dictator Game, to the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, to the Trust Game, and ending with 
the Public Good Game. The strategy method was used in the experiment so each subject played all roles 
in each game. The computer system randomly chose a game from the experiment, randomly assigned 
roles, and implemented the subjects decisions to calculate the payoffs.  
We analyzed the data through regression analysis. The behavior we looked for in the  Dictator 
Game was altruism. In the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, we looked for behavior consistent with altruism 
and strategy.  In the Trust Game, we looked for behavior consistent with altruism, strategy, reciprocity, 
and trust. Lastly, in the Public Good Game we looked for behavior consistent with altruism, strategy, 
reciprocity, and  cooperation. We were able to identify relationships between these behaviors through the 
regression analyses we ran.  
We found that behavior in each game is predictive of behaviors in other games. For example, we 
found that the Dictator Game giving decision, which measures altruism, is predictive of average 
proportion returned in the Trust Game, which measures trustworthiness. We also find that the minimum 
acceptable offer (MAO) in the ultimatum bargaining game, which measures the envy component of 
inequity aversion, is predictive of the amount offered.  
There are three key findings relating to the Trust Game. The first finding is that the amount sent, 
which measures profit-seeking and expected reciprocity, is predictive of the average proportion returned 
in the Trust Game, which measures trustworthiness, often thought of as altruism and reciprocity. The 
second key finding relating to this game this game is that the amount sent is predictive of the 
unconditional contribution in the public goods game, linking trust to reciprocity as a result of profit 
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seeking. The last finding is that the strength of reciprocity in the Trust Game is predictive of the strength 
of reciprocity in the Public Good Game. There was another finding in the Public Good game that there is 
a strong relationship between average conditional contributions, which measure altruism and 
strategicness, and unconditional contributions, which measure reciprocity. 
The idea that behavior in one game is predictive of behavior in the other games indicates that a 
person’s preferences when making economic decisions are linked to each other. This suggests that in the 
future, predicting a person’s propensity to free ride may be easier through analysis of other economic 
decisions, such as their willingness to give to charity. These results could have extensive applications to 
public policy in the future, as more experiments are conducted on the subject. Additional research 
opportunities could be conducting a similar experiment with different games that measure similar 
characteristics, replicating the experiment with increased stakes, and increasing group size in some games 
(such as the public goods game, due to the increased likelihood of people to free ride in a larger group).  
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Chapter 2: Background 
In our background, we discuss four games related to our research. We first discuss the Ultimatum 
Bargaining Game, followed by the Dictator Game, as well as variables of interest in these two games. We 
then discuss the Trust Game, the Public Goods Game, and the use of the Strategy Method versus the 
Direct Response Method in research.  
 
2.1 Ultimatum Bargaining and Dictator Game 
Ultimatum Bargaining Game 
The ultimatum bargaining game of Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) is a game between 
two players, a Proposer and a Responder, bargaining over some amount X. The amount X, typically $10, 
represents the gain of exchange that would be lost if there was no trade. In the game, the Proposer offers 
an amount Y to the Responder, leaving himself with X-Y if the Responder agrees. If the Responder 
rejects the offer, both get nothing. There are two common variants to this game: rematching with a new 
player after each repetition and asking the Responder for a Minimum Acceptable Offer (MAO). 
The game is useful for measuring how people feel about allocations of money between 
themselves and others. The game theory approach assumes that players in this game are self-interested. If 
this is the case, then in theory the Proposer will offer the lowest amount of money possible and the 
Responder will agree to the trade because it is in their best interest to leave with something rather than 
nothing. In reality, Proposers tend to offer somewhere between 40-50% of the total amount and 
Responders reject offers of less than 20% about half of the time (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 
1982) , falsifying the assumption that players maximize their payoffs. 
The disconnect between theory and reality can be explained by negative reciprocity or inequity 
aversion. Negative reciprocity suggests that Responders reciprocate unfair behavior by harming the 
person who treated them unfairly, even at a substantial cost to themselves, as long as the cost to 
themselves is not larger than the cost to the other person. Inequity aversion theory states that a lopsided 
distribution is perceived as unfair by the Proposer and Responder as such, the Proposer will be willing to 
bargain in a way that might be costly to them but will express their concerns for fairness. 
 
Dictator Game 
 A variation of the Ultimatum Bargaining Game was the first dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler, 1986). In the first dictator game there were only two allocations: an uneven split favoring the 
dictator ($18,$2) and an even split ($10,$10). The Dictator was allowed to choose the split he preferred 
and the other person had no choice. In this sense, the “Responder” now has a passive role in which their 
10 
actions do not affect the outcome of the game (Camerer, 2003). In this experiment, they found that ¾ of 
people chose the equal split of money. 
In the dictator games that followed, the “Proposer” could offer any amount available. In these 
experiments, the Dictators allocated approximately 20% of the amount, showing that the Dictators were 
less generous than previously demonstrated in the first experiment. The dictator game is similar to the 
ultimatum game but it removes the pressure that the Responder has on the Proposer to make a more 
generous offer than he would otherwise (Camerer, 2003). In this sense, the game measures social 
preferences and altruism rather than strategic thinking. The 20% allocations showed that some of the 
money allocated in the Ultimatum Games was pure altruism rather than simply a strategic allocation of 
money to get the other person to accept the offer. 
Variables in Ultimatum Bargaining Game and Dictator Game 
There are many variables in the Ultimatum Bargaining game and the Dictator game that can be 
changed to observe the effects on outcomes. Camerer (2003) explains some of the variables in detail. 
Methodological variables, such as repetition, stakes, and anonymity, can change how the experiment is 
conducted. Many experiments used stationary replication to see if repeating the Ultimatum Bargaining 
Game matters. Repetition showed that some subjects adjust offers over time more strongly when they 
know what other subjects have done before, but in the end repetition had little impact on the outcome. 
Raising the stakes also has weak effect on rejection of fixed-percentage offers. Lastly, anonymity 
sometimes lowers Dictator allocations but has little effect in ultimatums. Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 
(1994) did a double blind dictator game experiment. To test for the effect of anonymity, the dictator got 
an envelope and entered a phone booth where he could take out the portion of the $10 he wanted to keep. 
Then, he would put the envelope in a cardboard box. Once all the dictators did this, the envelopes were 
taken out to see the distribution allocations. It was found that more than half of the subjects left nothing in 
the envelope and the mean allocation was 10%. Bolton and Zwick (1995) imposed 
experimenter-blindness in ultimatum games and found that anonymity lowers rejections very slightly. 
Demographic variables include gender, race, and age. In a study of gender in the dictator game 
with opportunity for third-party punishment, Eckel and Grossman (2001) found that women are more 
responsive to the price of punishment. It also showed that men are more self-interested than women. 
Additionally, race did have an effect. They saw that black students offered more and rejected more often. 
White students also did not repay the trust of Asian students as often (Glaeser et al., 2000). There were 
also studies done to see if academic major had an effect on the outcome and it showed that economics 
majors are more self-interested. The age variable also appears to be of interest as before age 5, children 
are self interested, from ages 5-7 children focus on strict equality as a way of preventing conflict, and 
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after age 7, they begin thinking in terms of equality (Damon, 1980). Lastly,  the effect of beauty and 
gender was tested with results showing that men were not especially generous towards attractive women, 
but women offered about 5% more to attractive men (Schweitzer and Solnick, 1999).  
The cultural variables are important in societies with more market integration. When conducting 
cross-cultural experiments, controlling stakes requires the experimenter to match the purchasing power of 
stakes in two different cultures. It is also important that the conductor keeps the meaning of instructions 
consistent between languages. The ideal experimenter would speak both languages and would be 
perceived similarly in both cultures. An ultimatum experiment ran in Peru in the Machiguenga found that 
the people there offered much less than was observed by any subject group and all offers were accepted 
except one (Henrich et al., 2000). It is important to note that this group in Peru was very isolated and that 
could explain why there was no sharing norm. On the other hand, in some cultures people overshared 
because accepting an unusually generous gift incurs an obligation to repay that person even more and is 
sometimes considered an insult.  
Descriptive variables change the description of the game but not the structure. Framing is an 
example of a descriptive variable. Describing an ultimatum game as an exchange lowers offers by 10% 
but leaves rejection rates unchanged (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1994). Also, it was found calling it a 
claim from a shared resource pool encourages generosity.  
Structural variables also change the game by adding moves. Bohnet and Frey (1999) did a one 
way identification in the experiment and found that when dictators could see/identify the recipient, the 
number of dictators leaving zero dollars decreased but the mean allocation stayed the same. However, 
when the recipient stood up and introduced themselves, the average allocation rose to half and some 
dictators gave more than half. Adding outside options can also have an affect on the game's outcome. 
Knez and Camerer (1995) conducted an experiment which added an outside option to the ultimatum game 
so when the proposers offer was rejected, the proposer earned $2 and the responder earned $3. They 
found that the disagreement rate was very high in this game at around 50%. In experiments where no 
information was provided about the amount being divided, responders accepted less in low information 
conditions and proposers generally exploited this behavior. Another structural change is turning this into a 
multi-person game. Doing this raises two important questions: What norms of fair division apply to more 
than two players? Are players willing to punish unfairness when it might affect an innocent party? 
Camerer (2003) The multiplayer game showed that social preferences are not based on judgments about 
another player's generosity, they are about judgement of fairness towards oneself. Intentions play a big 
part in the Ultimatum Bargaining game. Blount-Lyon (1995) was the first to see an important effect of 
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attribution of cause. She found that a person might reject because he did not like being treated unfairly by 
someone who benefits from it or because he just does not like unequal payoffs.  
Overall, methodological variables such as repetition, stakes and blindness had an impact on the 
results of the ultimatum bargaining and dictator game. It also showed that demographic variables like 
gender, age and race do have an affect on social preference. Cultural variables also had a large impact due 
to potential language barriers and the way that giving is perceived in different cultures. It showed that 
descriptive variables like framing can have a large impact on the rate of rejection in the dictator game. 
Lastly structural variables, changing the game by adding moves, had a large impact on the outcomes. 
 
Millionaires Behavior in Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
In an experiment with a large Dutch bank Smeets, Bauer, and Gneezy (2015) had subjects played 
the ultimatum and dictator games. People who had more than one million euro in their bank account 
played the dictator and ultimatum bargaining games with 100 euros. They found that in the dictator game, 
millionaires gave more money to lower income participants than to other millionaires. They also found 
that millionaires who were matched with a low income participant gave away more than in any other 
study done on the dictator game. This act of giving more away could be evidence for charitable giving. In 
the ultimatum bargaining game, they found that millionaires were not as generous towards low-income 
participants. Their theory behind this was that millionaires did not want to have an offer rejected by the 
low income responder and a millionaire could think a low income responder would reject a high offer 
because the responder could perceive the millionaire as pitying them. However, when asking the 
millionaires that participated, only 1 out of 106 expressed the pitying fear and 6 expressed concern that 
they would be rejected. So overall there is no evidence. These findings do have implications for 
organizations interested in receiving donations for charity from wealthy individuals. For example. 
Wealthy people may be more generous when they expect no direct benefit as seen in the dictator game. 
Overall, the results show that the behavior of wealthy individuals is very different from the other groups 
who have previously participated in studies of the ultimatum and dictator games.  
 
2.2 Trust Game 
The Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) trust game is designed to measure trust in economic 
transactions. The first player, the Investor, has X dollars which he can decide to keep or invest. If the 
player invests T dollars then he keeps X-T dollars for himself. The investment of T dollars earns a return 
of (1+R) so the new amount of money is (1+R)T dollars. The second player, the Trustee, must decide how 
to share the new amount with the investor. The Trustee keeps Y dollars and returns (1+R)T-Y to the 
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investor. In this game, trust is defined as the willingness to bet if another person will reciprocate your 
actions. Trust is a risky move because it goes against the Trustee’s self-interest to return money, but 
trusting can subsequently show if the Trustee is willing to sacrifice self-interest to satisfy a moral 
obligation. Typically, truster sends about 50% of what he has and the trustee typically receive about $15 
and send back about 1/3 of that ($5).  
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) stated that a fundamental assumption in economics is that 
people act in their own self-interest. However, in choice settings, behavior deviates from self-interest, and 
this is viewed as irrational. To explore this, they considered the role of trust in a two person exchange. 
They asked the questions: Is trust primitive in economic models of behavior? What factors increase or 
decrease the likelihood of trust in economic transaction? 
Having participants only play a trust game once with complete anonymity and no fear of 
punishment, we can see if trust in economic situations is primitive. The investment game goes as follows: 
Subjects in room A decide how much of their $10 show up fee to send to an anonymous partner in room 
B. Subjects in room B decide how much of the tripled money to keep and how much to send back to their 
partner. The experiment consisted of 32 pairs. In room A, only 2 of 32 people sent $0, 5 of the 32 people 
gave the entire $10. On average $5.16 was sent by room A with an average payback of $4.66 from room 
B. In room B, of the people who were sent more than $1, 12 returned $0 or $1 to their partner and 11 of 
the 28 subjects returned more than their partner sent. Investments of $5 had an average payback of $7.17 
and investments of $10.00 had an average payback of 10.20. The nash equilibrium for this game with 
perfect information is to send zero money back. However, reciprocity does occur. 
These results bring up the question, why do people trust? Equilibria where trust emerges is a 
small subset of possible equilibria that may occur and that trust is an evolutionary stable strategy (Kreps, 
1990). Trust can be defined in two actions: the trustor gives the trustee the right to make a decision and 
then the trustee makes a decision that affects both of them. The fact that subjects have no information on 
the history of the game raises the possibility that their investment decisions are influenced by social 
norms. Norms are a socially defined right by others to control an individual's actions (Coleman, 1990). If 
this is the case then it is rational for room A individuals to place trust because the norm is to reciprocate.  
When the double blind test was conducted with history of treatment each person received a report 
of the decisions of the previous 32 pairs of subjects who participated in the experiment already (Berg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995). This showed the people in room A that sent some amount of money that 
the people in room B did not always reciprocate. In this experiment, of the participants in room A only 3 
of 28 subjects sent $0 and 50% of the time subjects sent $5 to $10. In room B, of the 24 B subjects who 
were sent more than $1, 6 returned $0 or $1. Also, 13 of the 24 returned more than their partner resulting 
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in positive net returns. Investments of $5 had an average payback of $7.14 and investments of $10 had an 
average payback of $13.17. On average, subject A sent $5.36 resulting in an average payback of $6.46. 
Cox (2004) also conducted trust experiments, except he used a triadic experimental design. Other 
regarding preferences were defined as altruistic, inequality-averse, quasi-maximum, or malevolent. In this 
experiment, it was important to distinguish between actions motivated by reciprocity and other regarding 
preferences. Positive reciprocity was defined as  motivation to repay generous or helpful actions of 
another by adopting actions that are generous or helpful to the other person. Trust was defined as the 
beliefs that one agent has about the behavior of another. 
Cox (2004) designed an experiment that involves three treatments implemented in a between 
subject design. Treatment A was the investment game, the same one discussed above. Treatment B and C 
decompose the trust game with B being the first step in the trust game and treatment C being the second 
stage. Treatment B was the dictator game, so the second mover could not return any of the tripled amount 
given to them by the first mover. Lastly, treatment C was the reciprocity control dictator game which is 
the same as the investment game except the first movers did not have a decision to make. Each second 
mover was given a $10 endowment and first movers were given endowments in amounts equal to the 
amount kept by first movers in treatment A. Then, second movers were given additional dollar amounts 
equal to the tripled amounts received by the second movers in treatment A. The subjects were informed 
with a table of the exact inverse relation between the number of additional dollars received by a “second 
mover” and the endowment of the anonymously paired rst mover. 
The experiment consisted of 32 pairs of subjects. For treatment A, there were 6 cases where the 
first mover sent $0 and the second mover returned $0, 6 first movers sent exactly half of their 
endowments to the second movers and there were 2 second movers who kept all of the $15 and did not 
return anything, 4 returned $5 and 1 returned $3. Overall, 26 out of 32 first movers sent positive amounts. 
Can this be considered trusting behavior? Comparing the behavior of treatments in A and B will make it 
possible to answer this question. Also, 17 second movers returned positive amounts so there is an overall 
increasing relationship between the amount sent and the amount returned. Is this reciprocal behavior? 
Comparing treatment A and C will allow us to answer this question. 
When comparing treatment A and B, it is shown that the mean amount sent by first movers in 
treatment A was $5.97 and in treatment B was $3.63. This supports the conclusion that there is significant 
trusting behavior in the investment game. When comparing A and C, there were 13 out of 32 second 
movers in treatment C who returned positive amounts of money to the first movers. In treatment A, 
second movers sent an average $4.94 and in treatment C second movers sent an average of $2.06. 
Therefore, there is evidence of other regarding preferences (altruism and reciprocity) in this data. The 
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study showed that  this pattern of results are inconsistent with the subgame perfect equilibria in the case 
where players are expected to have self regarding preferences. Overall, this experiment provided evidence 
of altruism and other regarding preferences, trust, and reciprocity.  
Research shows that decisions are affected by observations on ethnicity, sex, and attractiveness. 
Eckel and Petrie (2011) conducted a typical trust game but tested for differences in amounts sent across 
different ethnicities and sexes. In the Eckel and Petrie variation, an additional step is added where 
subjects are allowed to purchase the picture of a partner for a predetermined, randomly assigned price for 
each partner. The experimental procedure for this research differed from that of Berg, Dickhaut, and 
McCabe (1995) in that the Second Movers made decisions using the strategy method where decisions 
were made for all possibilities of amounts received before the First Movers sent anything. Brandts and 
Charness (2011) and Amdur and Schmick (2012) compared literature on direct-response and strategy 
methods and found that in general, decisions are invariant to the method. Then, each person was paired 
with six different partners and subjects were randomly assigned to their roles (First or Second Mover). 
Once all decisions were made, one of the six games was randomly chosen for determining actual payoffs. 
The design of their experiment allows the possibility of calculating the demand for photos, quantifying 
their value, and exploring their effect on decisions. 
The experiment showed that given the opportunity, not all people purchased the photo - even at 
the lowest price of $0.20, only 50% of subjects made the purchase. Possible reasons that people choose to 
not buy this information are that they have time-inconsistent preferences or that they are self-serving and 
wish to hide their decisions behind bad luck or ignorance. As expected, as price of the photos increased, 
the purchases decreased. With respect to purchasing pictures, white senders have the highest demand 
being 40% more likely to buy a picture. Senders have a more inelastic demand for pictures than 
responders thus pictures are a normal good. This is also explained because senders have to make a more 
strategic decision compared to responders. 
In previous literature on the subject, it was found that men trust more than women but women are 
more trustworthy (Buchan, Croson, and Solnick, 2008) and that dark-skinned players trust less and are 
less likely to be trusted, though they are not any less trustworthy (Burns, 2005) (Wilson and Eckel, 2007). 
On average, white subjects send 1.9 fewer chips to a known black responder than to a known white 
responder. Whites did not send significantly more or less to an unknown partner than to a known black or 
white partner. Blacks sent 1.6 fewer tokens to a known black responder than to a known white responder 
but the difference was not statistically significant. However, blacks on average sent 1.5 tokens less 
regardless of ethnic group. Other ethnic groups did not differentiate the amounts sent. Additionally, men 
sent more tokens on average than women did to a known partner.  
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Using the strategy method, the Sender allocates the amount of chips he wants to send to the 
Responders and simultaneously, the Responder makes decisions for all possible outcomes of amounts 
received. This allows to calculate response functions for each responder. In general, higher amounts sent 
yielded a higher percentage returned meaning that the response function was upward sloping. However, 
the response function was downward sloping for blacks, and especially black women, such that a smaller 
percentage was returned from higher offers. The steepest upward sloping response function was 
demonstrated by white men. These slopes would mean that a money-maximizing sender should send less 
to a black responder and more to a white responder which was done by white senders but not by black 
senders. This could mean that black senders did not differentiate amounts due to in-group bias or because 
they did not anticipate the behavior. Other results based on ethnicity were consistent with in-group bias 
where responders favored a partner of the same race by sending higher amounts. In general, seeing the 
picture of a partner increased the percentage returned for any offer compared to not seeing it. The 
decision profits from this experiment model showed that overall, for white senders, profits were 38.6% 
higher compared to those who did not buy a picture. There were no significant effects of sex on decision 
profits on senders and there were also no significant effects of  sex or race on decision profits of 
responders.  
Smith (2013) used the data from the Eckel and Petrie (2011) experiment described above to 
examine the reciprocity effect. Cochard, Nguyen-Van, and Willinger (2004) define this “reciprocity 
effect” as the tendency for Second movers to return proportions increasing with the amount received. On 
average, Second movers who receive high amounts return high proportions. Smith argues that aggregate 
level reciprocity differs from individual level reciprocity. In reality, less than half of Second Movers in 
the sample for the paper demonstrate individual level reciprocity effects.  In total, data from 64 subjects 
was analyzed meaning that there was data from 32 Second Movers. 31% of Second Movers demonstrated 
reciprocity effects, 31% were neutral (amount did not change), 13% had decreasing average response 
functions, and 25% were free riders (returned nothing). When focusing on the response functions for each 
game, 22% of strategies showed reciprocity effects, 45% were neutral, 7% were anti-reciprocity, and 26% 
were free riders. The research showed that nearly all subjects had different response functions for 
different games. Most importantly, the research showed that there is heterogeneity among subjects with 
respect to demonstrating reciprocity effects. 
 
2.3 Public Goods Game 
In the traditional public goods game, which was initially used by people including: Marwell and 
Ames (1979),  Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) and Kim, Walker, and Dawes (1980), there is a group 
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of players and each has the choice to allocate their tokens between cash and the public good. For the 
individual exchange X was paid to the investor for each token granted. The group exchange was an 
investment which gave a Y return per token to the individual as well as the same return to all the others 
participating. Therefore the payoff that the individual received was dependent on other participants. 
The two previously accepted possible theories for outcomes in a public goods game: the 
economic/game-theoretic prediction, which states that individuals will contribute nothing since the 
payback for their contributions is half of that contribution,  and the sociologic-psychologic prediction, 
which states that individuals will contribute everything due to social norms, altruism, or group 
identification (Ledyard, 1995). The ideal outcome would be for individuals to contribute all of their 
money to the public good but this is not the real outcome. An application of public goods games is to 
evaluate environments that nurture better choices to get closer to the optimal contribution amount.  
There are four main categories of experiments that public goods games can survey - the first 
which is covered in the research of Ledyard (1995) -  voluntary contribution mechanisms over a wide 
range of environments, wide range of mechanisms over a limited class of economic environments, 
mechanisms in political environments, and those focused on applications. Some of the major findings on 
the first category of experiments (voluntary contribution mechanisms) are these: subjects contribute 
halfway between a Pareto-efficient level and a free-riding level in one-shot trials and initial stages, 
contributions decline with repeated trials, and face-to-face interactions improve contributions. 
Ledyard (1995) compares six major experiments in public goods environments which have had 
opposing outcomes - Bohm (1972); Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977); Marwell and Ames (1979); 
Isaac, McCue, and Plott (1985); Kim and Walker (1984); Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984). However, it 
is noted that all of these experiments differ from each other in at least two variables. These early works 
identified factors which improved contributions (communication and increases in payoff) and one that 
decreased contributions (repetition). There were also six other factors which were thought to possibly 
influence behavior: numbers, provision points, number of tokens, heterogeneity of payoffs and 
endowments, experience, and moral suasion. Three variable groupings are identified to facilitate analysis 
which are environmental variables, systemic variables, and design variables. 
The six variables discussed in Ledyard (1995) can have an impact on contributions and help to 
understand how different experiment designs can yield different outcomes (Ledyard, 1995). In addition, 
the study discusses the importance of a threshold for contributions since this affects the equilibrium point. 
The first variable analyzed is experience, repetition, and learning. There are a lot of unanswered questions 
with regards to this variable; however, one of the proven results is that in environments where there is a 
zero dominant strategy there is a decrease in contributions over time with more repetitions. 
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The next three variables are those with strong effects on contributions: marginal payoffs, 
communication, and numbers and rebates. Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) and Isaac and Walker 
(1988a) present data which suggest that independent of the number of subjects for N=4 or N=10, 
increasing the marginal payoff from 0.3 to 0.75, increases the participant's’ contribution. The number of 
participants in a study also appears to affect contributions. However, this result is confounded with the 
results for increasing marginal payoff (as more people are added they must be given fewer tokens or less 
marginal payoff to maintain returns the same). In several studies, however, it would appear that in larger 
groups people appear to contribute more.  
The purpose of Isaac, Walker, and Thomas’ (1984) paper discussed in Ledyard (1995) was to 
attempt to draw together the ideas of three of the most recent papers: Marwell and Ames (1979), Isaac, 
McCue, and Plott (1985), and Kim, Walker, and Dawes (1980). There are many definitions for free riding 
and in this paper they will propose a working definition along with the results of their experiment.  
The participants received these instructions: given a specific endowment of resources, 
participants faced the decision of allocating them between a private exchange (individual) and a public 
exchange (group). For the individual exchange $.01 was paid to the investor for each token granted. The 
group exchange was an investment which gave an equal specific return per token to all individuals 
participating. Therefore the payoff that the individual received was dependent on all participants’ 
investment. The experiment had three consistent treatment effects: group size, per capita return from the 
group investment and effect of subject experience in the experimental environment using a basic public 
goods experimental design. The data revealed that free riding behavior increases with repetition of the 
decision process and it increases as the MPCR decreases. 
The final variable with a strong effect is communication as demonstrated by Dawes, McTavish, 
and Shaklee (1977). An interesting aspect of communication in public goods is that with repetitions, 
contributions appeared to increase rather than decrease. This result appears to be pretty stable across 
experiments with no thresholds. In experiments with thresholds, the evidence is mixed.  
Some of the variables that do not yet have enough evidence to support their acceptance are 
homogeneity and information, gender, beliefs, group solidarity, unanimity, and revision and sequence. 
Homogeneity is a factor that appears to increase contributions compared to heterogeneity of marginal 
payoffs unless subjects do not have full information. There are some differences across genders such as 
those found by Mason, Phillips, and Redington (1991) where women appeared to contribute more than 
men at the beginning of experiments but that these differences vanished over time. Another research 
outcome by Isaac and Walker (1988a)  found that men contributed higher rates than women did but that 
when compared, the statistics were very similar. Beliefs also appear to affect individual contributions in a 
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way such that individuals who contribute more or less also believe that others will do the same. However, 
the only information on beliefs available comes from surveys therefore there is not enough evidence. 
It also appears that creating a sense of belonging to a group, or group identity, increases 
contributions based on experiments by two researchers but the claim is not certain. With respect to 
unanimity studied in one experiment, where a vote is held at the end of contributions to gauge whether 
participants are happy with the total contribution and a single “no” means that everyone receives their 
money back, there appears to be increased contributions but this is outweighed by a 13% success rate. In a 
sequential mechanism, subjects choose to contribute in a sequential order. In this method the contribution 
percent was the same compared to the simultaneous method (45.3 versus 42.9%). The difference is that 
when the sequential method was followed, the public good was provided about 50% more of the time 
compared to the simultaneous method. Lastly, the idea of revision is that participants can choose to 
increase or decrease their contributions in real time. In this method, Dorsey (1992) found an 11.5% 
contribution rate compared to that of Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) who found a 26% contribution 
rate. However, more research needs to be done in this area. Also, the decision costs, fairness, and moral 
suasion variables have unknown effects.  
Isaac and Walker (1988b) found that communication has also been investigated in the context of 
other environments where there were gains from cooperation. Given past evidence of this, they decided to 
find the implications of a presence or absence of a significant amount of communication. 
The game was the same as the one talked about above in Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984), 
however in Design I and II experiments the participants faced two consecutive series of ten decision trials. 
This allows Isaac and Walker (1988b) to vary communication within an experiment, providing between 
group, within group, and sequencing comparisons on the effect of communication. In this experiment, 
unlike previous experiments where communication was not allowed, subjects were brought together at 
four chairs so they had the opportunity to communicate with each other. They were told to not discuss 
quantitative aspects of the private information on their screen, side payments or physical threats.  
By switching from communication to non-communication, the results of the first test showed that 
communication reduces free riding even when the opportunity of communication follows substantial free 
riding in a non communicative environment. However, the second sequence of observations did not lead 
to higher contribution levels. The ameliorative effects of communication when it follows 
non-communication are relative to the case in which communication is present from the beginning. Also 
of the four experiments, three exhibited no defection in group agreements.  
In the second design they observed that levels of contributions to the group good increased 
significantly in the variety of conditions where communication was allowed compared to the base case. 
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Also they found that levels of contributions in experiments with symmetric endowments, contributions 
were higher when there were symmetric endowments. Lastly the levels of contributions in periods where 
there was communication before where much higher than when no communication existed.  
Designs I and II indicated that the communication mechanism is capable of increasing efficiency 
and the effectiveness mechanism is marginally reduced when changes in information and endowment 
allocations were introduced into the environment. In Design III was conducted with groups of eight and 
each subject faced a demand curve for the group curve specified as ​d​=$(.003375-.0001x) where x is the 
quantity of the group good produced per period. Given an identical demand function for each subject, 
identical returns from the private exchange and 52 tokens per subject, the optimal good contribution is to 
achieve 212 tokens per period which is only 50% compared to an optimal good contribution of 100% in 
the other two designs. This experiment found that in aggregate, communication is successful in fostering 
increases in efficiency even in this more complicated environment.  
Isaac and Walker (1988b) also found that group size and varying marginal returns had an effect 
on contributions. The experiment design was also the same as outlined in the first study, with the variation 
that out of the 24 experiments, half of them were four-person experiments and the other half were 
ten-person experiments. The experiments also varied the marginal returns having half of the four-person 
and twelve-person experiments using an MPCR of 0.3 for half and 0.75 for the other half. Isaac and 
Walker refer to strong free riders as those individuals who contribute less than a third of their tokens. 
Their data appears to suggest that as trials move through each consecutive round, the number of strong 
free riders increases and public good contributions decrease. 
The data also suggests that a lower MPCR, 0.3 in this case, greatly increases free-riding behavior. 
In other words, a lower marginal return for each token put to the public good means that fewer tokens are 
invested in the public good exchange. On average, groups with the high MPCR of 0.75 contributed 22.7% 
more than those in the low MPCR (only 3.65% contribution). There was also an average of 95% strong 
free riders in the group with the low MPCR compared to a 68.3% in the high MPCR group.  
Another observation gained from the data is that there are weak effects of number of participants 
per group in the contributions. The groups with a high MPCR do not seem to show effects for varying 
group sizes. The group size appears to have some effect on free riding in the groups with low MPCR but 
the effect is almost negligible. The average of contributions in the four-person groups compared to the 
ten-person groups is only 1% lower and had an average of only 3.35% more strong free riders.  
Andreoni (1995) makes a point to differentiate between kindness and confusion in public goods 
games. He refers to kindness as when subjects have experience of cooperation from outside the 
experiment such as benevolence and social customs appealing, that influence their behavior. He refers to 
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confusion as subjects being incapable of deducing the dominant strategy due to poor instructions or 
incentives. The experiment had three conditions. The first was the Regular condition which was the 
standard public goods game. The second was the Rank condition where the subjects were paid based on 
how their experiment earnings ranked in comparison to the other subjects. This takes away the kindness 
motivation which means any contribution would be due to confusion. The third was RegRank where the 
subjects got information on their rank but were paid based on experiment earnings. In this experiment 
subjects played in groups of 5 and were given 60 tokens for each iteration. The experiment revealed that 
about 75% of subject were cooperative; half were confused about incentives and half understood free 
riding but decided to cooperate out of kindness. When comparing Regular to Rank, the Regular 
contribution should be more cooperative than Rank. In the experiment they found that Rank subjects free 
ride more the most and Regular subjects free ride the least. When comparing Regular to RegRank the 
decrease in cooperation from Regular to RegRank can be classified as kindness or confusing because it is 
solely due to the subjects getting information about their rank. When comparing Rank and RegRank, the 
Regrank contributions were lower than the Rank contribution therefore information about rank decreases 
the amount given more than it decreases the number of givers. Overall this experiment shows that 
kindness and confusion are important in generating cooperative moves in the public goods game. 
Andreoni (1988) examines the two most proposed hypotheses for the decay in public goods 
provision with repeated trials: strategies and learning. The learning hypothesis suggests that a single game 
does not allow subjects the time to learn incentives. The strategies hypothesis states that participants give 
more than the free riding amount at the beginning because of rational and strategic play to appear like 
they do not understand the optimal behavior of free riding. To test for strategic play, two game 
configurations were created: Partners and Strangers. The Partners configuration was the control group 
where people remained in the same group of people for all 10 rounds of the game. In the Strangers 
configuration, they were randomly assigned at each round to a new group. Based on the strategy 
hypothesis, it is expected that Partners will give more to the public good than Strangers especially in the 
early game. To test for learning, after the 10th round, the subjects were told that they would start a new 
set of 10 rounds (the game was ended after 3 rounds). If learning is what causes decay then the restart 
should have no effect on either of the subjects. 
There were six observations made - three related to the strategy hypothesis and three related to 
the learning hypothesis. The three observations related to the strategy hypothesis were that: Partners gave 
less than Strangers in all 10 rounds with the difference increasing as the last round approached; Partners 
choose to free ride a greater percent of the time than Strangers do, with the greatest difference in the last 
round; Partners give the least in round 10, but still give more than the free riding amount. This result does 
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not provide support for the strategy hypothesis because based on the strategies hypothesis, it is expected 
that Partners will give more than Strangers especially early in the game. Additionally, it was expected that 
in the tenth round, both groups of people would free ride. 
The three observations related to the learning hypothesis were these: Strangers gave more than 
the partners in the last round; the restart affects Strangers only temporarily; after the restart, partners give 
more to the public good again and the effect appears to last until the last round of the restart. These 
observations also do not provide support for the learning hypothesis because based on the learning 
hypothesis, neither of the groups should be affected by the restart of the game. Since neither of these 
results provide support for either the strategy or learning hypotheses, the paper could not confirm that 
people follow the standard theorized conceptions of free riding behavior.  
An experiment was done to see the effect of punishment on the public goods game and Fehr and 
Gaechter (2000) hypothesised that when punishment is in play, there will be less free riding. To test this 
they had four different treatments. The first was stranger-treatment with punishment, in this treatment the 
subjects groups were changed from period to period. The without punishment condition gave the 
experimenters a control group for stranger-treatment. The next treatment was partner-treatment with 
punishment where the members of the group remained the same across all the periods. Lastly was 
partner-treatment without punishment which also served as a control group. Results showed that the 
existence of punishment caused a rise on average contribution levels in the stranger-treatment and 
partner-treatment where on average subjects contributed 58% of their money. In stranger-treatment 
without punishment average contributions were close to full free riding over time. In the partner-treatment 
without punishment average contributions converged towards full free riding where the punishment 
condition caused them to converge to full cooperation. Overall this study showed that the potential for 
punishment had a large effect on contributions although it conflicts with with models of pure altruism 
because an altruistic person would not use a costly option to reduce the other subject's payoff.  
Conditional cooperation is another variable that was examined by Fischbacher, Gaechter and Fehr 
(2001). Their experiment was similar to the standard public goods game, there are four subject that decide 
how to spend 20 tokens. Subjects went to the actual decision situation with two different types of 
contributions, called unconditional contributions and the conditional contribution table. The unconditional 
contribution was a single decision about how much to contribute to the public good. The contribution 
table is where the strategy method is applied. Subjects have to indicate for each of the 21 average 
contribution levels of other group members, how much they are willing to contribute to the public good.  
After the decisions are made, subjects were told that a random mechanism would determine 
which of their decisions would become relevant. The random generator would pick three players whose 
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unconditional contribution decision gets implemented and then the fourth persons conditional contribution 
gets implemented based on the average from the other three members. The game was played only once, so 
repetition was not examined. 
The results showed that the subjects decisions fell into three different categories. The first 
category, conditional cooperation, showed that 22 (half) of the participants increased the contributions of 
the other member. The next category was free riders, which was made up of 13 players (30%) who wrote 
“0” in all of the entries. The last category was made up of six subjects (4%) who had close to perfect 
levels of contribution up to 10 tokens and then began to steadily reduce their contribution. The 
interpretation of these results was that a fraction of people will free ride regardless of others contributions 
and those who do cooperate conditionally display a selfish bias and contribute less than others on average. 
 
Strategy Method  
Brandts and Charness (2011) compile and analyze several studies that compare the 
direct-response versus the strategy-method to check whether the different response methods affect 
player’s actions. The importance of this study is that the strategy method is useful for collecting data for 
points in a game that are not usually observed. The strategy method also provided more information and 
additional results than the direct-response method did for certain studies (Brandts and Charness, 2011). 
There are two theories on the matter: the game-theoretic view says that it should not cause a difference in 
behavior whether the strategy or direct-response method is used on the results while the behavioral view 
criticized the cold nature of the strategy method making it less realistic than a direct-response.  
There are more studies that find no difference in behavior based on the elicitation method (16) 
than those that find that the strategy method leads to different behavior (4). There were also nine studies 
that found mixed results. Using binomial testing, there are a significantly greater amount of studies that 
find no difference than those that did. Three possible factors could be causing the differences: emotions, 
complexity and length of the game. Little significance was found for emotions as a factor causing 
behavioral differences using chi-square testing. However, there is a slight possibility of 1 in 32 that 
punishment with direct response is higher when using the strategy method. The complexity of the game 
was a possible factor in determining behavior with differences being more likely when the game had more 
decisions available to the players. The length of the game, or whether the game was carried out in a single 
one-shot trial or in multiple rounds, was also considered a factor but it was observed that differences in 
behavior decrease over time. Overall, Brandts and Charness (2011) conclude that the strategy method 
does not produce results significantly different from the traditional direct-response method. 
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Summary 
Overall, we have examined four common economic theory games. The ultimatum bargaining 
game sets up a trade between two participants where one offers a certain quantity and the other can either 
accept it or reject it. In general, this game shows strategicness as well as altruism and the results tend to 
show that people offer approximately 40-50% of their endowment and offers of less than 20% are often 
rejected. The dictator game is similar to the ultimatum bargaining game with the lack of rejection, which 
shows only the amount of altruism or inequity aversion of the dictator. The usual allocation of money in 
the dictator game is approximately 20%. 
The trust game is a game where a Truster sends money, which is increased by a certain percent on 
the way, to a Trustee and the Trustee can choose how much money to return. Typically, Trusters send 
about 50% of their endowment and receive a third of the increased amount back from the Trustees. Lastly, 
the public good game is that where a group of participants can choose whether to invest in a private or 
public good with different return rates. Depending on the variables, the results can vary but the variables 
with the strongest effect are repetition and the percentage of return from the public good. 
In all these games, it is possible to use a strategy method or a direct response method which yield 
similar results. However, the strategy method provides more data for analysis.  
No one has analyzed the extent to which these games are interrelated. Is a public good 
“free-rider” more likely to be less generous as a dictator? Is a more trustworthy person more likely to be a 
generous contributor to the public good? These are the types of questions we investigate in our study.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
Our methodology includes information on experiment procedures, why certain data was collected, 
and information that the subjects received prior to and during the experiment. All of the data was 
collected in the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) Experimental Economics Laboratory on the second 
floor of the Salisbury Laboratories building on varying times of the day over the course of WPI’s B term, 
2017. 
 
3.1 Subject Recruitment  
Subjects were recruited from an introductory Economics course at WPI where participation in an 
Economics experiment was required as part of the grade for the course. In order to register for an 
experiment session, subjects logged into the Regi25 page and chose the upcoming experiment session. 
  
3.2 Experiment 
For each experimental session, there were eight (8) subjects. However nine (9) students were 
invited to each session in case one did not attend. If all of the students showed up on time, then the last 
student to arrive was paid a show-up fee of 10 dollars and was awarded the credit for participation. 
Subjects were seated at individual computer stations which were partitioned by a cubicle wall and 
used the computer software Ztree to input their allocation decisions. Each session lasted approximately 50 
minutes. Subject interaction was limited to inputting choices into the computer. At no point during the 
experiment was there face-to-face communication between subjects. 
Before subjects arrived, the computers that were as widely spaced as possible were turned on. The 
spacing was to limit verbal and physical communication between the subjects. At the beginning of the 
session, subjects were given two copies of a consent form outlining procedures, foreseeable risks and 
discomforts from participation, and payment in the experiment. These forms were approved by the WPI 
IRB. In order to begin, the subjects had to  agree to the terms outlined in the consent form and sign one of 
the copies that was returned to us; the other copy was for subjects to take with them after the session.  
Each subject then obtained copies of the instructions. Instructions then were read aloud ​prior to 
starting the experiment as well as before each Task, ​with time for questions and answers (Instructions in 
Appendix A. The eight subjects that participated in the experiment and were paired or grouped at the end 
depending on the task selected. At the end of the experiment the computer randomly selected a task for 
the pay out. All interactions were completed through the computer to ensure that subjects remained 
anonymous to each other. The experiment was designed using the strategy method, which included 
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role-reversal so for each of the games, the subjects made decisions for all roles in the game. The 
experiment consisted of 4 Tasks: the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, the Trust Game, 
and the Public Goods Game. The official names of the games were not disclosed in the instructions to 
avoid question wording bias and to limit subjects’ recognition of the games if they had heard about them 
previously. Instead, Task 1-4 were called the Giving Game, the Propose and Respond Game, the Send and 
Return Game, and the Contribution Game. All instructions for each task were handed out immediately 
prior to each Task, read aloud, and then time was allowed for any questions. Once this was done, subjects 
made all decisions for each Task. 
 
Task 1 
Task 1 had one decision. The instructions informed each subject that he had an endowment of 
$30. It then explained that each subject had to decide how much of the $30 to keep for himself and how 
much to give to the recipient. The amount had to be an increment of 3 between 0 and 30. This was done to 
keep consistency across games in terms of the number of options and reduce the number of choices 
participants had to make. This also keeps the number of decisions and endowment consistent across 
games. Subjects were informed  that if this was the task randomly chosen for the actual monetary payoff, 
then there were two potential outcomes. The computer would randomly assign each subject to a pair. 
Then the first possibility was that a subject was chosen as the giver and the $30 was divided between him 
and the person with whom he was randomly paired based on his giving decision. The second was that he 
was not chosen to be the giver and the other subject’s giving decision would determine how much of the 
$30 he received as a potential payoff.  After the instructions were read, all subjects made their giving 
decision. This task was indicative of preferences for altruism and/or guilt: if a subject gave any amount of 
money to the other subject, since he was not under any pressure to give money for strategic reasons (as in 
Task 2), any money that was given could be interpreted as either guilt or altruism. Camerer (2003) 
summarizes previous experiments, results and interpretations in his book​ Behavioral Game Theory​. 
 
Task 2 
Task 2 is the ultimatum bargaining game, first published by Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 
(1982). The proposer was endowed with $30 and the responder was endowed with nothing. The subject 
made two decision plans: one for the amount that he would offer to the responder and one for whether he 
would accept or reject each possible amount offered. The amount offered to the responder was limited to 
increments of $3 in order to reduce the number of decisions for the accept/reject decision plan, as well as 
to equalize the number of decisions between Tasks 2-4 to 12 decisions. Each subject was informed of the 
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potential monetary payoff he would receive if Task 2 was randomly selected as the actual monetary 
payoff. If Task 2 was selected, then the computer randomly assigned subjects to pairs. From there, the 
first possibility was that the subject was randomly chosen to be the proposer and the offer decision plan 
determined how much he offered to the responder. The other subject’s accept/reject decision plan 
determined whether his offer was accepted. The second possibility was that the subject was randomly 
chosen to be the responder and his accept/reject decision plan determined whether the proposer’s offer 
was accepted. From this game, we gained insight on each subject’s strategic preferences (as the proposer) 
and inequality aversion or envy (as the responder). If any subject gave any amount of money larger than 
what he gave in the dictator game, then this must be the amount of money that he is strategically giving in 
order to have their offer accepted. Analyzing the responder preferences, we can observe the degree to 
which he is willing to sacrifice his own payoff to avoid an unequal split of money. 
 
Task 3 
In Task 3, the Truster and the Trustee were each endowed with $10. This is the game that was 
created by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Subjects made two decision plans: an investment plan, 
the amount he would choose to send to the Trustee out of the $10 he started off with, and a return plan, 
the amount that he would return to the Trustor after the amount . The subjects were informed of the 
potential payoffs in the event that Task 3 was randomly chosen for the actual monetary payoffs. If Task 3 
was chosen, then the computer would randomly assign subjects to pairs. From there, the first possibility is 
that the subject was randomly chosen to be the sender and his “send” decision plan determined how much 
he offered to the receiver. The other subject’s return decision plan will determine how much he receives 
as a payoff. This second possibility was that the subject was randomly chosen to be the receiver and the 
other player’s “send” plan will determine how much he received, then your “return” plan from the dictator 
like position will determine how much you keep (and give back to the sender) as payoff. This game 
measures predisposition to trust and altruism. When we examine the amount sent by the truster, we can 
see trusting behavior and if we examine the amount sent back by the trustee we can look for the level of 
altruism and reciprocity (Cox, 2004).  
 
Task 4 
In​ ​Task 4,  all four subjects in a group were endowed with $10. Subjects made two decision 
plans: an unconditional contribution, an amount they would contribute regardless of how much others in 
the group contributed, and a conditional contribution plan (Fischbacher, Gaechter, and Fehr, 2001), the 
amounts they would contribute for each average contribution by the others. If Task 4 was chosen for the 
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actual monetary payoff, then the computer would randomly assign subjects to groups of four. It would 
then randomly choose the unconditional contribution for three out of four people in the group. The fourth 
subject’s conditional contribution was determined based on the three unconditional contributions. Actual 
payoffs were determined using the payoff equation: 
 ayof f 0 ndividual contributionp = 1 − i 4 people
2 sum of  contributions*   
for each subject's contribution amounts chosen in the two previous steps.  This game measures the 
subjects’ willingness to contribute to the public good. From the results we can identify those who free ride 
and those who cooperate. 
Once all tasks were completed, a questionnaire was administered to the subjects collecting 
demographic as well as contact information. Earnings for the subjects were randomly chosen from the 
potential payoffs from Tasks 1 through 4. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to sign cash 
receipt forms to confirm that they had received money from the study and then were paid in a private 
manner. 
 
3.3 Nash Equilibrium & Social Optimum 
Under the traditional assumption of self-interest, the Nash Equilibrium can be determined for the 
four games. The Social Optimum on the other hand focuses on maximizing the total payoff, and says 
nothing about the distribution of payoffs.  
The Nash equilibrium in the Dictator Game is for the Giver to give $0, since the dictator is 
self-interested and wants to keep the maximum amount for himself. However, people tend to not follow 
this equilibrium, they usually allocate about 20% of their endowment (Camerer, 2003). The social 
optimum in the dictator game is any allocation because at the end of the game, $30 is distributed amongst 
the players regardless of the decisions made.  
The Nash equilibrium for the Ultimatum Bargaining Game is for the Proposer to give the 
minimum payment of $3 or $0 since he is self-interested and wish to give the least amount possible. The 
Responder should accept any amount greater than $0, according to Nash Equilibrium because he is 
self-interested and any amount larger than $0 is considered a gain, i.e. receiving something is better than 
receiving nothing. However if the responder is offered $0, he is indifferent between accepting or rejecting 
because he ends up with the same amount regardless of that decision. Thus it is safer for the proposer to 
offer $3 and ensure that he will end up with the $27. Typically, proposers offer somewhere between 
40-50% of the endowment and Responders reject offers of less than 20% about half of the time (Güth, 
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Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Camerer 2003). The social optimum in the ultimatum bargaining 
game is any offer as long as it gets accepted. 
The Nash equilibrium for the Trust Game is for the Truster and Trustee to send and return $0 
since they are both self-interested and expect the other to be self-interested too. Since the Truster knows 
that the Trustee is self-interested and does not have any incentive to return money, the Truster will send 
$0. For the self-interested Trustee, it is rational to keep all the money that he receives and not return 
anything. The social optimum in contrast is for the trustor to send his whole endowment. This way, the 
total amount of $40 can be obtained. Typically the truster sends about 50% of what he has and the trustee 
typically receives about 33% of that back (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995; Camerer, 2003). 
The Nash equilibrium of the Public Good Game is for each group member to give $0 and end up 
with $10. The social optimum would be for everyone to contribute their $10 this way the total of $80 is 
reached and each player would receive $20 back. With conditional cooperation, about 30% are free riders 
who follow the null hypothesis and 50% contribute at the level of the conditional contribution 
(Fischbacher, Gaechter and Fehr, 2001). 
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1:​ The amount offered will have a positive relationship with the giving decision and a positive 
relationship with the minimum acceptable offer (MAO).  
 
Rationale: ​There is a positive relationship with the giving decision because is a measure of altruism and 
the guilt component of inequity aversion.  So if all the other components are accounted for, we expect that 
someone who gives a lot in the dictator game is more likely to send more in the ultimatum bargaining 
game due to altruism. There is a positive relationship between amount offered and MAO because 
someone who offers more will expect to be offered more and therefore not be willing to accept less and 
have a higher MAO. 
 
Hypothesis 2:​ The MAO will have a negative relationship with the giving decision and positive 
relationship with the amount offered.  
 
Rationale: ​There is a negative relationship with the giving decision because someone who gives more 
would be willing to accept less due to altruism. There is a positive relationship with the amount offered 
because someone who accepts less and has a higher MAO would offer more due to inequity aversion.  
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Hypothesis 3:​ The amount sent will have a positive relationship with giving decision, a positive 
relationship with amount offered, a negative relationship with MAO, a positive relationship with the 
average proportion returned in the Trust Game, and a positive relationship with the responsiveness to the 
amount received in the Trust Game.  
 
Rationale: ​There is a positive relationship with the giving decision because someone who is altruistic in 
the dictator game would expect others to be altruistic and therefore be more trusting and send more 
money in the trust game. There is a positive relationship with amount offered because a proposer that 
sends more money out of altruism than strategicness, is likely to be more altruistic than a proposer who 
sends less. A more altruistic person is more likely to expect others to behave similarly, so he would 
expect the Receiver to return a considerable amount. Since there is this expectation on the returns, the 
Sender is likely to send more money. There is a negative relationship with MAO because if the responder 
rejects low amounts is because of inequity aversion specifically envy. Therefore he will give less as a 
sender in the trust game because he wants equal payouts and it will be equal for each person to leave with 
their initial endowments than to contribute and have the receiver keep more making the payoff unequal. 
There is a positive relationship with the average proportioned returned because due to reciprocity so if 
someone sends more as the sender, they are likely to send more back as the receiver. There is a positive 
relationship with the responsiveness to the amount received in the trust game because someone who sends 
more is doing it because they expect reciprocity so they would give more back as a receiver to reciprocate 
the action. 
 
Hypothesis 4: ​The average proportion returned will have a positive relationship with giving decision, a 
positive relationship with amount offered, a positive relationship with MAO, a positive relationship with 
amount sent, and a positive relationship with responsiveness to amount received.  
 
Rationale: ​There is a positive relationship with the giving decision because if the dictator sends more 
money it is because of altruism so the average proportion returned would be higher. There is a positive 
relationship with the amount offered if the proposer offers more in the ultimatum game out of altruism 
instead of strategy, then he is likely to send a large amount back as the receiver. There is a positive 
relationship with the MAO because if the responder in the is altruistic then he will be willing to accept 
low amounts and he will give a larger proportion back back to the sender in the trust game. There is a 
positive relationship with the amount sent because someone who sends more is doing it because they 
expect reciprocity so they would return a larger proportion as the receiver to reciprocate the action. There 
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is a positive relationship with the the responsiveness to the amount received in the Trust Game because if 
the player is more responsive he will send back more money leading to a higher proportion returned.  
 
Hypothesis 5:​ The responsiveness to amount received in the Trust Game will have a positive relationship 
with the giving decision, a positive relationship with amount offered, a positive relationship with MAO, a 
positive relationship with the average proportion returned in the Trust Game, and a positive relationship 
with amount sent.  
 
Rationale: ​There is a positive relationship with the giving decision if a dictator sends more money, this 
would mean that he is more altruistic or exhibits inequality aversion since he has no pressure to send any 
money. Likewise, the receiver has no pressure from the sender to return money back to the sender. So the 
more money a person sends as a Dictator, the more money he will return as a Receiver. There is a positive 
relationship with the amount offered because if the proposer offers more in the ultimatum game out of 
altruism instead of strategy, then he is likely to send a generous amount back to the sender in the trust 
game. There is a positive relationship with the MAO because if the responder in the is altruistic then he 
will be willing to accept low amounts and he will give more back to the sender in the trust game. There is 
a positive relationship with the average proportion returned in the trust game because if the player is more 
responsive he will send back more money leading to a higher proportion returned. There is a positive 
relationship with the amount sent because  someone who sends more is doing it because they expect 
reciprocity so they would give more back as a receiver to reciprocate the action.  
 
Hypothesis 6​: The strength of conditioning on the contributions of others has a positive relationship with 
the giving decision, a negative relationship with amount offered, a negative relationship with MAO, a 
negative relationship with the amount sent, a positive relationship with the average proportion returned, a 
positive relationship with the responsiveness to amount received, a positive relationship with the 
unconditional contribution, and a positive relationship with the average conditional contribution.  
 
Rationale: ​There is a positive relationship with the amount given because the more the person gives 
altruistically, the more he will match others contributions to maximize overall payoffs. There is a negative 
relationship with amount offered which can be attributed to a strategist mindset: a strategist is a person 
who gives a high amount as a proposer because he wants to maximize his payoffs and any amount that is 
rejected will not accomplish this. However, a strategist would give a low amount as a conditional 
contribution because the payoffs have already been secured and giving an amount of zero would be 
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strategic to maximize payoffs. There is a negative relationship with the MAO in the trust game because in 
the trust game if the responder rejects low offers because of inequity aversion, then he will be a strong 
conditional cooperator in the public goods game.  
There is a negative relationship with the amount sent if the sender is profit seeking and sends 
money with that motivation. This could cause them to send more to increase likeliness of a higher payoff 
and contribute less to the public good for the same reason. There is a positive relationship with the 
average proportion returned and responsiveness to amount received in the Trust Game because all three of 
these decisions are dependent on the contributions of others. For trust the amount he gives back is 
dependent on the sender and the total payout in the public goods is contingent on the other three people's 
contribution. So someone who has more money as a receiver will be likely to send a higher percentage 
back and for the conditional public goods the player is more likely to match the amount to maximize 
payoffs for everyone.T 
There is a positive relationship with unconditional contribution someone who is willing to 
contribute their entire endowment as their unconditional contribution is more likely to give at least the 
average conditional contribution. The same goes for the opposite. Someone who contributes 0 as their 
unconditional contribution is more likely to contribute less than or equal to the average contribution 
during the conditional contribution.  There is a positive relationship with the average conditional 
contribution because as a person’s average conditional contribution increases, this means that he is more 
likely to give to the public good and likewise, a person with a stronger conditioning on the contributions 
of others is more likely to give to the public good if others contribute.  
 
Hypothesis 7:​ The average conditional contribution has a positive relationship with the giving decision, a 
positive or negative relationship with the amount offered, a positive or negative relationship with the 
MAO, a positive or negative relationship with amount sent, a positive relationship with the average 
proportion returned, a positive relationship with the responsiveness to amount received in the Trust Game, 
a positive relationship with the unconditional contribution, and a positive relationship with strength of 
conditioning on the contributions of others.  
 
Rationale: ​There is a positive relationship with the giving decision if a dictator gives more then that 
means that he is acting with altruistic behavior. Likewise, a conditional contribution is a choice made 
when the player has full information on the choices of others but only has personal motivations, again like 
altruism, that are independent of other players’ because the other players have no way of retaliating 
against the person making the conditional contribution. So a person who gives more as a dictator is more 
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likely to give more as his conditional contribution. The relationship with amount offered can go either 
way depending if the person is a strategist or an altruist. The negative relationship can be attributed to a 
strategist mindset: a strategist is a person who gives a high amount as a proposer because he wants to 
maximize his payoffs and any amount that is rejected will not accomplish this. However, a strategist 
would give a low amount as a conditional contribution because the payoffs have already been secured and 
giving an amount of zero would be strategic to maximize payoffs. The positive relationship would be one 
where the person is an altruist. This person would give a high amount as a proposer because he is 
altruistic and would also give a high amount as a conditional contribution for the same reason, even 
though his payoff does not depend on how much he gives. The relationship with MAO can go either way. 
There is a positive​ ​relationship if the responder is altruistic than he are willing to accept low amounts in 
the trust game and will be a strong conditional cooperator in the public goods game. There is a​ ​negative 
relationship if the responder rejects low offers because of inequity aversion, then he will be a strong 
conditional cooperator in the public goods game.  
The relationship with amount sent can go either way. There is a​ ​positive​ ​relationship when 
someone who sends the maximum amount in the trust game is more likely to contribute greater than or 
equal to the conditional contribution in the public goods game if they are giving out of altruism. There is 
also a negative relationship if the sender is profit seeking and sends money with that motivation. This 
could cause them to contribute less to the public good because they are trying to maximize their payoff. 
There is a positive relationship with the average proportion returned because both of these decisions are 
dependant on the contributions of others. For trust the amount he gives back is dependant on the sender 
and the total payout in the public goods is contingent on the other three people's contribution. So someone 
who has more money as a receiver will be likely to send a higher percentage back and for the conditional 
public goods the player is more likely to match the amount to maximize payoffs for everyone. There is a 
positive relationship with the responsiveness to the amount received in the Trust Game because they are 
linked by reciprocity and responsiveness. So if a player reciprocates more in the Trust Game they will 
likely reciprocate the conditional contribution in the Public Good Game.  
There is a positive relationship with the unconditional contribution because someone who is 
willing to contribute high amounts unconditionally is also likely to give at least the average conditional 
contribution, if not more. The opposite is true for people who are less willing to contribute 
unconditionally; these people will give less than or equal to the average conditional contribution. There is 
a positive relationship with strength of conditioning on the contributions of others because as a person’s 
average conditional contribution increases, this means that he is more likely to give to the public good and 
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likewise, a person with a stronger conditioning on the contributions of others is more likely to give to the 
public good if others contribute.  
 
Hypothesis 8:​ The unconditional contribution will have a positive relationship with the giving decision, a 
positive relationship with amount offered, a negative relationship with MAO, a positive relationship with 
amount sent, a positive relationship with the average proportion returned in the Trust Game, a positive 
relationship with responsiveness to amount received, a positive relationship with the strength of 
conditioning on the contributions of others, and a negative relationship with the average conditional 
contribution.  
 
Rationale: ​There is a positive relationship with the giving decision because someone who offers more in 
the dictator game does it because of altruism so he is likely to offer more of his endowment in the public 
goods game. There is a positive relationship with amount offered because if a proposer sends more 
money, that means he is more altruistic or strategic. If the person is motivated by altruism and he offers 
more as a proposer, he will contribute more unconditionally because he has the expectation that others are 
also altruistic and expect others to do the same. There is a negative relationship with the MAO because if 
he is profit seeking then he will be willing to accept low amounts and have a high unconditional 
contribution in the public goods game.  
There is a positive relationship with amount sent because if the sender gives his full endowment 
to the truster in the trust game, then the sender is trying to maximize the total profits and they have 
reached the socially optimal equilibrium. For the public goods game the unconditional contribution would 
also be the entire endowment because he is trying to maximize total payoffs and reach the socially 
optimal equilibrium. There is a positive relationship with the average proportion returned in the Trust 
Game because if the receiver in the trust game is altruistic then they will return a large proportion to the 
sender and they would have a high unconditional contribution sue to altruism as well. There is a positive 
relationship with the responsiveness to amount received because if the player will give more back that 
they receive then they are likely to have a high unconditional contribution. 
There is a positive relationship with the conditioning on the contributions of others because 
someone who is willing to contribute a large amount to the unconditional contribution is more likely to 
give at least the average conditional contribution. There is a negative relationship with the average 
conditional contribution because is a player gives less as an unconditional contribution it is because he 
has a strong preference for fairness or inequity aversion. So he would contribute more to the average 
conditional contribution because he knows others contributions and the fair amount for him to contribute. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
We conducted six sessions with eight subjects each, for a total of 48 subjects. The strategy 
method was used in all four games, giving us 1 decision in the Dictator Game, 12 decisions in the 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 12 decisions in the Trust Game and 12 decisions in the Public Good Game. This 
gave us  37 observations per subject, 296 observations per lab session and 1,176 observations in total. The 
payoffs in each game had the potential to range from $0.00 to $30.00. The average payoff from this 
experiment was $13.18 with a minimum of $0.00 and a maximum of $27.00. 
The summary statistics are outlined in Table 1 below. The average giving amount in the Dictator 
Game was approximately $11.56, approximately one-third of the subject’s initial endowment of $30. 
Comparing this to the literature, the number is slightly higher than the commonly occurring 20% giving of 
the initial endowment (Camerer, 2003).  
For the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, we can compare statistics on the minimum acceptable offer 
and the offer to the literature. In our experiment, we see that the average MAO is $8.81,  roughly 29% of 
the proposer’s offer. This statistic is also a bit high compared to the 20% found in literature. Proposers in 
our experiment, gave an amount almost exactly the same as the amount expected of 40% of their 
endowment, $12.19 of the given $30.  
In table 1, there are also statistics on the Trust Game for each proportion returned, represented by 
the “TG prX” and on the amount that was sent in the Trust Game. Our statistics for this game match up 
nicely to previous experiment results: Trustees typically return approximately an average of one-third the 
amount that they receive and Trusters send 50%, or $5.02,  of their initial endowment of $10. The 
minimum amount given of $0 suggests that there were subjects that gave $0 and the maximum amount 
given is $10 which suggests that there were also subjects that gave all of their endowment, which matches 
previous experiments. 
For the final game, the Public Good Game, Table 1 shows that the average unconditional 
contribution is approximately half of the $10 endowment and there are people giving $0 as well as $10. 
This shows that there are free-riders as well as perfect contributors. This is also the case for the minimum 
and maximum conditional contributions. However, for the conditional contributions we also observe that 
the amount contributed increases as the average amount contributed by others increases which is 
consistent with  Fischbacher, Gaechter and Fehr (2001). 
In our results, we will analyze patterns in the raw data for the Dictator Game, Ultimatum 
Bargaining Game, Trust Game, and Public Good Game variables. We will also discuss regressions 
between these games. 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
4.1 Dictator Game Results 
In the Dictator Game, the mean amount given was $11.56. The distribution of offers is 
represented in in ​Figure 1​. The most common offer was $15.00 with 18 subjects giving that amount. 
Traditional economic theory predicts that the dictator would give nothing because of self interest. Only 
four subjects followed theory and gave $0.00. The rest of the subjects diverged from traditional theory 
and we can attribute this behavior to altruism. Additionally, we see four subjects giving more than half of 
their money, suggesting that these may have been confused during this game. 
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  Figure 1. Giving Decision Amounts in the Dictator Game (Increments of 3, Max. 30) 
 
4.2 Ultimatum Bargaining Game Results 
In the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, the average amount offered was $12.18. The most common 
offer was $15.00 with 26 subjects offering that amount. Theory suggests that the proposer offers the 
minimum increment above $0.00 and the responder accepts any offer greater than $0.00. The proposer 
would not offer $0.00 because there is the possibility that the responder will reject due to the fact that 
there is no benefit either way. There were no $0.00 offers which can be attributed to strategy. However 
only 7 subjects gave the minimum increment above 0, the rest of the subjects gave more than that, as seen 
in ​Figure 2​. One subject proposed an amount greater than half of the amount, which is unusual behavior. 
 
Figure 2. Ultimatum Bargaining Amount Offered (Increments of 3, Max. 30) 
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 The average minimum acceptable offer was $8.18. Four subjects said that they would accept an 
offer of $0.00 and 11 subjects said they would accept an offer of $3.00 which adheres to traditional 
theory. The distribution of minimum acceptable offers can be seen in ​Figure 3​.  
 
Figure 3. Ultimatum Bargaining Minimum Acceptable Offer Amounts (Increments of 3, Max. 30) 
 
4.3 Trust Game Results 
In the Trust Game, the average amount sent was $5.02 and the most common offer was $5.00 
with 11 subjects offering that amount and the second most common offer was $10.00, the full 
endowment, with nine subjects offering that much. Traditional economic theory predicts that sender 
would not send any of their endowment and only 4 of the subjects played according to theory. The 
distribution of the amount sent can be seen in ​Figure 4. 
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 Figure 4. Trust Game Amount Sent (Increments of 1, Max. 10) 
 
The average proportion returned from amount received was calculated by ,( )/nΣ Amount Received
P artner Amount Sent  
where n equals the number of participants. The proportions returned averaged between 30.6% and 36.7% 
for each of the potential amounts received. Traditional theory predicts that the responder would return 
nothing to the sender but the data shows that the responders did reciprocate.  
 
Figure 5. Trust Game Average Proportion Returned 
 
For each subject, we individually regressed the proportion returned on the amount that was sent to 
the subject The Alphas represent the intercepts of these regression analyses and the Betas represent the 
slopes. The distribution of Alphas and Betas can be seen in ​Figure 6​ and ​Figure 7  
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The Beta shows how responsive people are to changes in the amount received. A negative Beta 
signifies that as the amount received increases, the person returns a smaller proportion. A Beta of 0 
indicates that the amount received has no effect on the amount returned. A positive Beta means that as the 
amount received increases, so does the proportion returned. Theory predicts that a person would have a 
Beta of 0, since they would return 0 for each amount received. In our sample, 14 people had a positive 
Trust Game Beta and 5 had a negative Trust Game Beta. 27 people had a Beta close to zero.  
 
Figure 6. Trust Game Individual Alphas for Proportion Returned 
 
Figure 7. Trust Game Individual Betas for Proportion Returned 
 
4.4 Public Good Game Results 
In the Public Good Game, theory predicts that subjects do not contribute anything to the public 
good. The mean unconditional contribution was $5.06; however, the most common contribution was 
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$10.00, contributed by 10 subjects, the next was $5.00, contributed by 9 subjects, and then $0.00 and 
$4.00, contributed by 7 subjects each. The unconditional contributions can be seen in ​Figure 8​.  
 
Figure 8. Public Good Unconditional Contributions 
 
Figure​ ​9​ shows the average conditional contribution made by the subjects in the Public Good 
Game. This was calculated by  for each of the amounts of Others(Conditional Contributions)/nΣ  
Contributions where n equals the number of participants. We can see that the line is upwards sloping so as 
other’s average contribution increased, the average conditional contribution increased. The increase in the 
average conditional contribution shows cooperation so when others contribute more and it is known to the 
subject, they are likely to reciprocate that action and cooperate to maximize the benefit to the public good.  
 
Figure 9. Average Conditional Contribution Based on Others Contributions 
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For each subject, we individually regressed the conditional contribution on the average 
contribution of others from the Public Good Game. The Alphas represent the intercepts of these 
regression analyses and the Betas represent the slope intercept. The distribution of Alphas and Betas can 
be seen in ​Figure 10​ and ​Figure 11. 
The​ ​Public Good Beta shows how responsive people are to the average amount contributed by 
other members of the group.. A negative Beta signifies that as others’ average amount contributed 
increases, the person contributes a smaller proportion. A Beta of 0 indicates that others’ amount 
contributed has no effect on the amount returned. A positive Beta means that as others’ average amount 
contributed increases, so does the proportion contributed. Theory predicts that a subject would have a 
Beta of 0, since he should not be contributing anything to the public good regardless of what others 
contributions are. In our sample, 27 people had a positive Public Good Beta and 2 had a negative Public 
Good Beta. 19 people had a Beta close to zero. 
 
 
Figure 10. Public Good Game Individual Alphas for Conditional Contribution 
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 Figure 11. Public Good Game Individual Betas for Conditional Contribution 
 
 
4.5 Regressions 
In this section, we will present a total of 27 regressions on 8 different variables: Amount Offered, 
MAO, Amount Sent, Average Proportion Returned (a + 15b), TG Beta, PG Beta, Average Conditional 
Contribution (a + 5b), and Unconditional Contribution. The Average proportion returned which is 
referred to as a+15b in our regressions is the midpoint of the response function from the Trust Game and 
uses the Alphas and Betas described above and the number 15 is used because the subject has the 
potential to return anything from 0 to 30. The Average Conditional Contribution which is referred to as 
a+5b in our regressions is the midpoint of the response function from the Public Good Game. It also uses 
the Alphas and Betas found through the individual regression analyses and the number 5 is used because 
the subjects have the potential to return anything from 0 to 10.  
For the purposes of the regressions, we analyze that the games - Dictator Game, Ultimatum 
Bargaining, Trust Game, Public Good Game - in order of increasing complexity. For each of our 
regression tables, we follow a similar structure: in the first regressions, the more primitive game variables 
are the focus (Dictator Game and Ultimatum Bargaining are grouped together in one regression table due 
to their similar nature and Trust Game variables tend to have a separate regression, if applicable). In the 
following regressions, we regress the other variables within the same game on the current variable of 
focus. In the final regression, we regress all other variables on the variable of choice to determine whether 
any variables maintain their significance. 
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Table 2: Ultimatum Bargaining Game Variables Regressed on Dictator Game Variables 
 
The data shows a significant (at the 99% level) positive relationship between the giving decision 
from the dictator in the Dictator Game and the amount offered from the proposer in the Ultimatum 
Bargaining Game. This supports hypothesis 1 which says a subject who gives a lot of money as a dictator 
will likely give a lot of money as a proposer because they are being driven by altruism. These was also a 
significant positive relationship (at the 90% level) between amount offered and minimum acceptable offer 
(MAO) which suggests that the more someone offers as the proposer, the less they are willing to accept as 
the responder. There is a strong positive relationship (at the 90% level) between MAO and the amount 
offered in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game. This suggests that the if the subject has a higher MAO they 
will offer more and if they offer more they are likely to have a higher MAO which supports hypothesis 2.  
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Table 3​ shows a positive relationship (at the 90% level) between the average proportion returned 
(a + 15b) and the amount sent. This means that if a person sends more, then he will tend to return a higher 
average proportion. This would align with expectations: a person that sends more money and is trusting of 
others would return a greater proportion in the position of the receiver. This supports hypothesis 4 which 
says there is a positive relationship between the amount sent from the sender and the proportion returned 
from the receiver.  
The average proportion returned also has a positive relationship to the giving decision (at the 99% 
level) which supports hypothesis 4. This means that a person returning a higher proportion of the amount 
that he received would also be willing to give more in the Dictator Game, ultimately linking 
trustworthiness and altruism. The more trustworthy a person is, the more altruism he will show. Also, 
there is a positive relationship (at the 90% level) between the average proportion returned to amount sent 
in the Trust Game which supports hypothesis 4. The data suggests that someone who returns a money as 
the receiver is likely to trust others more therefore send more of their endowment as the sender.  
 
Table 4: PG Beta Regressed on Dictator Game, Ultimatum Bargaining Game, Trust Game, and Public 
Good Game Variables  
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Table 4 ​shows a positive relationship between the Trust Game Beta and the Public Good Beta (at 
the 99% level). This means that there are high levels of reciprocity in both games so reciprocity in the 
Trust Game can be predictive of high reciprocity in the Public Good Game. This supports hypothesis 6 
which says that if the receiver in the Trust Game reciprocates the actions of the sender, then his 
conditional contribution in the Public Good Game will reciprocate the the actions of those around him and 
he is likely to cooperate. There is also a positive relationship between the average conditional contribution 
(a + 5b) and the Public Good Beta (at the 95% level). This would mean that the more a person contributes 
conditionally, the more they will contribute if other’s unconditional contributions are greater which 
supports hypothesis 6. 
 
Table 5:  Average Conditional Contribution Regressed on Dictator Game, Ultimatum Bargaining Game, 
Trust Game and Public Good Game Variables  
Table 5​ shows a negative relationship (at a 95% level) between amount sent in the Trust Game 
and the public good beta which supports hypothesis 7. This could be because the subject sent a significant 
amount of money because they are profit seeking and not because of kindness. So this player would offer 
more money in the Trust Game and free ride with the conditional contribution of the Public Good Game. 
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This is consistent with Hypothesis 18 with the motivation being strategic, not altruistic. There is a positive 
relationship (at the 95% level) between the average conditional contribution in the Public Good Game and 
the average proportion returned in the Trust Game. This relationship says that high levels of reciprocity in 
the conditional contribution of the Public Good Game is predictive of high levels of reciprocity from the 
receiver in the Trust Game which supports hypothesis 7. 
There is also a strong positive relationship between the ave conditional contribution and the 
unconditional contribution in the Public Good Game. This says that high conditional contributions to the 
public good are predictive of a high unconditional contribution. This supports hypothesis 7 which also 
says that if someone contributes very little to the conditional contribution and free rides, then they are 
likely to contribute a minimal amount of his endowment to the unconditional contribution and continue to 
free ride.  
 
Table 6: Unconditional Contribution Regressed on Dictator Game, Ultimatum Bargaining Game, Trust 
Game and Public Good Game Variables  
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There is a significant relationship (at the 99% level) between the amount sent in the Trust Game 
and the unconditional contribution in the Public Good Game that supports hypothesis 8. This says that if 
the sender sends more money it is because he is trying to maximize his profits so therefore he would send 
more as his unconditional contribution because he is also trying to either maximize the payoff in that 
game or is expecting reciprocity from the responder. There is also a significant relationship between the 
unconditional contribution and the average conditional contribution in the Public Good Game (at the 99% 
level) which supports hypothesis 8. The data suggests that someone who is willing to contribute more of 
their endowment as their unconditional contribution would give at least the average for their conditional 
contribution.  
There is also a significant negative relationship (at the 95% level) between the unconditional 
contribution in the Public Good Game and the average proportion returned in the Trust Game. This could 
be due to multicollinearity because it is suggests that the more you contribute as your unconditional 
contribution, the less you return in the Trust Game which is inconsistent with our other findings.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Overall, our findings showed support for several of our hypotheses regarding relationships 
between behaviors in different games. One of our major findings is that the giving decision in the Dictator 
Game is highly predictive of the amount offered in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game and the proportion 
returned in the Trust Game. With this information we can determine that these behaviors are driven by 
altruism more than strategy. Another major finding is that there is a strong relationship between the 
reciprocity in the Trust Game and the strength of conditioning on the contributions of others in the Public 
Good Game. This also has important applications outside of these games because if you know that a 
person will reciprocate because of behavior in the Public Good Game you can trust them more in other 
instances, such as in the Trust Game, or maybe even any situation resembling the Trust Game. 
The idea that behavior in one game is predictive of behavior in another game indicates that a 
person’s characteristics when handling economic decisions are linked to each other. This suggests that in 
the future, predicting a person’s propensity to free ride may be made easier through analysis of other 
economic decisions, such as their willingness to give to charity. These results could have extensive 
applications to public policy in the future, as more experiments are conducted on the subject. Additional 
research opportunities could be conducting a similar experiment with different games that measure similar 
characteristics, replicating the experiment with increased stakes, and increasing group size in some games 
(such as the public goods game, due to the increased likeliness of people to free ride in a larger group). 
In this study we found that there is validity to looking at the behaviors across games because 
behavior in one game is predictive of behaviors in other games. It shows that knowing behavior from one 
game can predict behavior outside of that specific game.  
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Appendix A: Instructions 
This is an experiment in decision-making. It lasts about 45 minutes. The allocation decisions that you                
make will result in actual monetary payoffs paid in cash at the end of the experiment. Please do not talk                    
to others during the experiment. If you have a question, raise your hand, and we will help you. 
  
The experiment consists of four tasks, each with a unique potential monetary payoff. You are to                
complete all four tasks. We will explain each task immediately before it begins. You will input your                 
allocation decisions using your computer. After all tasks are completed, the computer will randomly              
determine and inform you of which potential payoff you will receive as an actual payoff. 
  
During each task, you will receive information that is relevant to determining your potential payoff for                
that task. Since you will not know (while making your decisions) which task will be used for                 
determining your actual payoff, you should make all of your decisions carefully. 
  
After you receive final information on your actual monetary payoff (cash at the end of the study), we                  
will ask you some demographic and contact information. Payments will then be made in a private                
manner. 
  
Are there any questions? 
 Are you ready for the instructions for Task 1? 
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A1: Task 1  
Task 1 is called the giving game. Two people are randomly paired, and one person within each pair is                   
randomly chosen to be the giver; the other becomes the recipient. The giver is provided with $30 (the                  
recipient is provided with nothing). The giver must decide how much of the $30 to give to the recipient                   
(a multiple of 3 between 0 and 30, inclusive. Ex: 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, or 30). The giver keeps                         
the rest of the $30. For this task, everyone will make a giving decision, but once all decisions are made                    
the computer will randomly decide who is the giver. 
  
Payoffs: 
If Task 1 is later chosen randomly by the computer to determine actual monetary payoffs, there are two                  
possibilities: 
1) You are randomly chosen to be the giver and your giving decision will determine how the 
$30 is divided between you and the person with whom you are randomly paired. 
2) You are not chosen to be the giver and the other person’s giving decision will determine how 
much of the $30 you receive. 
  
Are there any questions? 
Are you ready to do the decision-making for Task 1?  
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A2: Task 2 
Task 2 is called the propose and respond game. Two people are randomly paired, and one person within                  
each pair is randomly chosen to be the proposer; the other becomes the responder. The proposer is                 
provided with $30. The proposer offers some part of the $30 (a multiple of 3 between 0 and 30,                   
inclusive) to the responder. The responder either accepts or rejects the offer. If the responder accepts, the                 
responder receives the offer as his potential payoff, and the proposer keeps the $30 minus the offer as his                   
potential payoff. If the responder rejects the offer, both people get nothing as their potential payoffs, and                 
the game is over. 
  
For this task, everyone will make decisions for both the roles of proposer and responder. To clarify, you                  
will make two decision plans: how much to offer as a proposer and whether you will accept or reject                   
each potential offer amount. These decisions will determine your potential payoff for this task. 
  
Payoffs: 
If Task 2 is later chosen randomly by the computer to determine actual monetary payoffs, there are two                  
possibilities: 
1) You are randomly chosen to be the proposer and your offer decision plan will determine how                
much you offer to the responder. The other person’s accept/reject decision plan will determine              
whether your offer is accepted. 
2) You are randomly chosen to be the responder and your accept/reject decision plan will              
determine whether you accept or reject the proposer’s offer. 
  
Are there any questions? 
Are you ready to do the decision-making for Task 2?  
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A3: Task 3 
Task 3 is called the send and return game. Two people are randomly paired, and one person within each 
pair is randomly chosen to be the sender; the other becomes the receiver. Both people start with $10. The 
sender decides how much of his $10 (a whole number between 0 and 10, inclusive) to send to the 
receiver. The amount sent is tripled before it is received by the receiver (this means that the receiver could 
potentially receive any amount between $0 and $30, in increments of $3). The receiver will then have his 
starting $10 plus the amount he received. The sender will have $10 minus the amount sent. The receiver 
then chooses how much of the amount received (a whole number between 0 and the amount received, 
inclusive) to return to the sender. The receiver keeps the rest as a potential payoff. The sender gets $10 
less the amount sent, plus the amount that the receiver chose to return as a potential payoff, and the game 
is over. 
  
Everyone will make decisions for both the roles of sender and receiver. To clarify, you will make two                  
decision plans: how much to send (a whole number between 0 and 10, inclusive) and how much to                  
return for every possible amount received (whole numbers between 0 and the amount received,              
inclusive). 
  
Payoffs: 
If Task 3 is later chosen randomly by the computer to determine actual monetary payoffs, there are two                  
possibilities: 
1) You are randomly chosen to be the sender and your “send” decision plan will determine how                
much you send to the receiver. The receiver’s return decision plan will determine how much you                
get back from the receiver, and therefore, how much you get as a payoff. 
2) You are randomly chosen to be the receiver and the other player’s “send” plan will determine                
how much you receive, and then your “return” plan will determine how much you keep (and give                 
back to the sender). The sum of your starting $10 and the part that you receive from the sender that                    
you keep will be your payoff. 
  
Are there any questions? 
Are you ready to do the decision-making for Task 3?  
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A4: Task 4 
 
Task 4 is called the contribution game. Everyone is randomly assigned to groups of 4. Each person starts                  
with $10. Each person decides how much of his $10 (a whole number between 0 and 10, inclusive) to                   
contribute to the “group account.” Any amounts not contributed are simply kept by the person. The sum                 
of all four people’s contributions to the group account is doubled, and then divided evenly among all                 
four people in the group – this is equivalent to returning 0.5 times the sum of contributions to each                   
person in the group. Therefore, payoffs in the contribution game can be calculated using the following                
equation: 
 
 
payoff ​= 10 − ​individual contribution ​+ 4 people
2 sum of  contributions*  
 
 ​For this task, everyone will make two contribution plans. The first one will be an “unconditional” 
contribution, which will not depend on how much others contribute. You simply choose a contribution 
amount (whole number between 0 and 10, inclusive). 
  
The second contribution plan is “conditional” and depends on how much others contribute. Based on the 
average contribution of the other three people in your group (rounded to the nearest whole number), you 
will choose how much of your $10 you would like to contribute (a whole number between 0 and 10, 
inclusive). 
  
You should make all of your contribution decisions carefully because when you make them, you will not 
know which one will be relevant for determining actual monetary payoffs. 
  
Payoffs: 
If Task 4 is later chosen randomly by the computer to determine actual monetary payoffs, the computer 
will follow these steps: 
1) The computer randomly chooses 3 out of the 4 people in the group to have their unconditional 
contributions count as their actual contributions. 
2) The  fourth  person’s  conditional  contribution is determined based on the three other 
unconditional (now actual) contributions. 
3) Actual payoffs are now determined using the payoff equation and all players’ contribution 
amounts, as determined by steps 1) and 2). 
  
 
Are there any questions? 
  
Are you ready to do the decision-making for Task 4?  
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Appendix B: Screenshots  
The following appendices present screenshots of what subjects saw during the experiment session. 
 
B1: Task 1 Screenshot 
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B2: Task 2 Screenshot 
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B3: Task 3 Screenshot 
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B4: Task 4 Screenshot 
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B5: Payoff Feedback Screenshot 
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